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For nearly two decades, the share of trade in inputs, also called vertical trade, has dramatically 
increased. This paper suggests a new measure of international trade: “value-added trade”. Like many 
existing estimates, “value-added trade” is net of double-counted vertical trade. It also reallocate trade 
flows to their original input-producing industries and countries and allows to answer the question 
“who produces for whom”. In 2004, 27% of international trade were "only" vertical specialization 
trade. The sector repartition of value-added trade is very different from the sector repartition of 
standard trade. Value-added trade is less regionalized than standard trade. 
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Introduction 
The recent development of regional trade agreements has sparked the fear of the emergence of 
antagonist regional trade blocks.2 It is not actually clear that the spaghetti bowl of regional trade 
agreements really can have this kind of effects by itself.3 It is certain that, e.g. East Asia has recently 
experienced a growing regionalisation of its trade, suggesting his development is becoming more self-
centred.4 Yet, the already rich literature details the reasons behind the high intensity of vertical trade in 
regional trade in East Asia underlines, that its regionalization is exaggerated by the importance of 
vertical trade: Asia trade as a whole is still very dependent on demand from the other continents, 
especially America.5 This is not easy to see in standard trade statistics. 
Cross-border production networking (variously named de-localization, disintegration of 
production, fragmentation, global production sharing, international outsourcing, slicing up the value 
chain, processing trade…), encouraged by extensive FDI flows, has been an important part of recent 
globalization in general and regionalization in particular.6 Different stages of production are spread 
across a range of production sites in multiple countries. This vertical specialisation of production is 
based on a new international division of labour moving away from the traditional division where 
production is split up between primary and manufactured goods. Segmentation of production is 
becoming increasingly subtle, maybe in order to make the best of the “kaleidoscope” comparative 
advantages of each country.7 This new international division of labour has logically induced the 
acceleration of trade flows since the end of the 1980s as a growing number of inputs are crossing 
several borders. This resulted in a rapid expansion of trade in inputs, some of which are intermediate 
goods. The multiplication of input trade has been facilitated by the cut in tariff and nontariff barriers 
within the framework of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements: vertical specialization is 
                                                     
2 World Bank (2000). 
3 Baldwin (2006), Ethier (1998). 
4 Kwan (2001), Chortareas and Pelagidis (2004). 
5 See the review in Haddad (2007). 
6 Feenstra (1998). 
7 Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994). 
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especially sensitive to trade costs, as it implies an increase in the number of borders crossed by each 
goods.8 
In this context, it is well known that international trade statistics fail to offer a good picture of 
trade integration and global division of labour. They cannot answer the question “who produces for 
whom?”. Let us take a different example from the canonical Barbie doll and Nike shoe to illustrate the 
point. The firm Burberry sends bottles of French perfume to Shanghai to be decorated with Scottish 
pattern before bringing them back to be sold on the French market. Standard trade statistics suggest 
that France is exporting perfume bottles to China and China exporting perfume bottles to France.9 Yet, 
France does not export anything for Chinese consumption, as perfumes are consumed in France. China 
simply exports decoration for French consumption. Suppose the pigments used for the decoration of 
these perfume bottles are imported from Japan to China. This Japan-China trade flow does not mean 
that China consume Japanese products, as the final consumer is in France. Unravelling these long 
supply chains is impossible using simply trade statistics.  
This paper examines how taking into account vertical trade changes the answer to the question 
“who produces for whom” in the world economy. It advocates the study of trade flows using “value-
added trade”.10 Compared to “standard trade”, “value-added trade” is net of double-counted vertical 
specialization trade.11 This paper’s contribution is to use coherent trade and input-output data from 
GTAP to reallocate trade flows to their original input-producing industries and countries. It computes 
value-added trade for 66 regions and 55 sectors in 1997, 2001, 2004. It also computes value-added 
trade for 113 regions in 2004.12 
The difficulty of measuring value-added trade lies in taking into account all the stages of 
production of a final good in order to track the value-added coming into its production from each 
sector and each country. First, second, third… stage inputs must be isolated. This can only be done 
                                                     
8 Yi (2003). 
9 Examples from Benhamou (2005), p. 19, 25 and 96. 
10 It has long been recognized that trade and GDP are not directly comparable because trade is not measured in 
terms of exchanged value-added: Irwin (1996), Feenstra (1998), Cameron and Cross (1999). 
11 Vertical trade sometimes designates intra-industry trade in goods of different qualities. This is not the object of 
this paper. 
12 Similar exercises using 1997 and 2001 GTAP data can be found in: Belke and Wang (2005), Daudin, Rifflart, 
Schweisguth, and Veroni (2006) and Johnson and Noguera (2009). All these researchers seem to have developed 
their methods independently. 
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thanks to a coherent worldwide set of intermediate delivery matrices and bilateral trade matrices. The 
GTAP database includes the necessary information.13 
In a first section, the paper presents vertical specialization trade, and its existing measures. In a 
second section, it presents a method to compute value-added trade. In a third section, it presents some 
results on vertical trade and value-added trade and compares them to results obtained by other 
methods. It shows how much standard trade statistics give a distorted picture of the relative openness 
of different sectors. In a fourth section, it compares regionalisation in different parts of the world. It 
shows that Asia is not an exception in having an important part of its regionalization linked to vertical 
trade. The real exception is Europe, which regionalization is the less dependent on vertical trade. 
1. Vertical specialization trade  
1.1. What is it? 
This paper follows the definition by Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998). There is vertical 
specialization of trade (or “vertical trade” for short) as soon as: 
- the production of a good follows a sequential process that can be broken down in several stages;  
- at least two countries take part in this production process;  
- at least one country imports inputs to produce the goods of which a fraction of the production is 
exported. 
Based on that definition, two different measures of trade can be identified. The first one, which 
we call “standard trade”, measures trade flows based on their market value when they cross borders. 
When exported goods contain a high proportion of imported inputs, their market value can be very 
high compared to locally produced value-added. This measure can lead to a very high export to GDP 
ratio, sometimes exceeding 100%14 (as in the cases of Ireland and Singapore). The other measure, 
called “value-added trade”, measures trade net of vertical trade and reallocates the value-added 
produced at the different stages of the production process to each of the participating countries and 
                                                     
13 Dimaranan (2006). 
14 In our data, this is the case of Malta and Ireland (102%), Luxembourg (129%), Malyasia (133%) and 
Singapore (173%). 
 5
industry. Value-added trade corrects for that and measures only the trade flows between the producer 
and the final user. 
Let us take the example of three countries A, B and C. 
Figure 1: Three ways to look at the same trade flows 
 
The left side of the figure shows total trade flows as they appear in standard trade statistics (for 
shorthand “standard trade”). The top right figure shows vertical trade. “Cars without windshields” are 
counted twice in standard trade statistics: once when they are exported from A to become inputs in B 
and once when they are exported from B for consumption in C. The bottom right figure shows “value-
added” trade. 
Value-added trade flows imply that country A does not actually trade with country B in the sense 
that no final user in country B utilizes goods from country A. All the final users of country A’s exports 
are in country C. Similarly, the industrial picture of trade is changed. Standard trade flows suggest that 
country A does not export services. Yet, its services production is being consumed, once it is 
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embedded in cars, in country C. In that sense, country A is actually exporting services. 
Value-added trade flows can change our assessment of regionalisation. Imagine that country A 
and country B are in the same region. Standard trade flows suggest that intra-regional trade flows are 
nearly as important as extra-regional trade flows. Yet, value-added trade flows suggest that intra-
regional trade flows are nil in the sense that no one in country A or B is consuming goods produced in 
another country in the same region. Both countries are producing for country C’s consumption. This is 
a very different case of regionalisation than one in which country B actually depends on country A for 
its final consumption.  
1.2. How can it be measured? 
Vertical trade can be measured in three ways.15 The first way is to use firm surveys. But these are 
only available for a limited number of countries (notably the United States and Japan) and present a 
number of limitations. They have been used to study trade in intermediate inputs by multinational 
firms.16  
A second method is to use fine industrial classification of trade.17 E. g. Athukorala and Yamashita 
have measured vertical trade for most countries in the world in the context of the five-digit SITC, Rev 
3 classification, by treating some goods belonging to categories 7 (machinery and transport 
equipment) and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured articles) as component inputs. They find that world 
trade in components increased from 18.5 percent to 22 percent of world manufacturing exports 
between 1992 and 2003.18 This method cannot be extended to measure value-added trade. 
The third and most traditional method is to use input-output tables.19 The most extensive use of 
this method is by Yi and his various co-authors (these papers are subsequently referred as “Yi and 
alii”).20 They calculated international vertical specialisation trade, defined as the share of imported 
                                                     
15 For a survey, see Feenstra (1998). 
16 Hanson, Mataloni Jr, and Slaughter (2005). 
17 E.g. Fontagné, Freudenberg, and Ünal-Kesenci (1996), Ng and Yeats (1999), Yeats (2001) (this paper also use 
data coming from special favourable treatment for re-imported domestically produced components), Ng and 
Yeats (2003), Egger and Egger (2005). 
18 Athukorala and Yamashita (2006). 
19 E.g. Fontagné (1991), Campa and Goldberg (1997). 
20 Ishii and Yi (1997), Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999), Hummels, Ishii, and 
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inputs in exports, using input-output matrices of 10 OCDE and 3 non-OECD countries.21 In their 
computation, Yi and alii take into account imported goods directly used as inputs for the production of 
exports, but also imported inputs used for the production of domestic inputs used in the production of 
exports: they call all these flows “VS” for vertical specialization trade. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) 
extrapolate their results to the rest of the world. They find that the share of vertical trade in world 
merchandise exports was equal to 18% in 1970 and 23.6% in 1990.22 
But vertical trade is wider than VS. Purely domestic-produced exports can also be part of vertical 
specialization trade if they are subsequently used by another country as inputs in its own exports: Yi 
and alii call this flow “VS1”. Computing VS1 is more difficult than computing VS. VS can be 
computing using solely the delivery matrix of the reporting country whether VS1 requires matching 
bilateral trade flow data with intermediate delivery matrices for all trading partners.23 By construction, 
VS in the exports of country A is equal to VS1 in the exports of all other countries to country A. For 
the world as a whole, VS is equal to VS1. 
One can further distinguishes the part of VS1 that comes back to the country of origin: VS1*. 
VS1* is defined as the exports that are, further down the production chain, re-imported as embedded 
inputs for final use. VS1* is the domestic content of invested or consumed imports. A typical example 
is trade in motor vehicles and parts between the US and Mexico and Canada. When the US import cars 
from Mexico for its own consumption, motors made in the US are part of VS1*. The total value of 
value-added trade is equal to standard trade minus VS and VS1*.24 Total world vertical exports are 
equal to VS+VS1*. 
Our paper’s method is similar to Hummel et alii’s, but we compute VS for many more countries 
in three years: 1997, 2001 and 2004. Furthermore, because we use world wide input-output tables 
reconciled with bilateral trade statistics, we can also compute VS1, compute VS1* and reallocate 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Yi (2001); Yi (2003); Chen, Kondratowicz, and Yi (2005). 
21 Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001). 
22 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), table 1. Also see Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999), table 5. 
23 VS1 is computed from some case studies in Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998) and from input-output tables 
in Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999). 
24 Something similar is found in Chen, Kondratowicz, and Yi (2005), pp. 58-60, though it seems that they 
confuse VS1 and VS1*. 
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vertical trade to its initial producer. 
2. How to compute trade flows in value-added 
2.1. GTAP database 
Computing international trade flows in value-added requires the use of input-output tables and in 
particular of intermediate deliveries matrices reconciled with bilateral trade data. Leontief in the 1930s 
computed the first input-output tables and set the foundations of input-output analysis.25 This branch 
of economics has in turn nourished general equilibrium modelling, allowing for the construction of 
simple computable economic models relying on the Leontief inverse matrix.26 Such models make 
possible the analysis of direct and indirect effects of changes in one economic variable on all others. 
They have also been used for the study of international trade, in the context of Computable General 
Equilibrium Models (CGEM). In this context, they must be reconciled with bilateral trade data. This 
has been done by the GTAP project (Global Trade Analysis Project). 
The project started in 1993 at Purdue University (United States). It associates 24 international 
organisations and research centres among which the United Nations, WTO, the European 
Commission, OECD and CEPII. GTAP's goal is to improve the quality of quantitative analysis of 
global economic issues within an economy-wide framework. It provides databases and programmes 
for CGEM. We work with versions 5 (for 1997), 6 (for 2001) and 7 (for 2004) of the GTAP database, 
which cover 55 sectors for 66 « regions » (countries or countries groups) in 1997, 87 « regions » in 
2001 and 113 “regions” in 2004. We work both with 66 regions to compare each year’s result and with 
113 regions for 2004. The database provides final demand and input-output tables for each region. In 
each input-output tables, two full intermediate deliveries matrices are available: one for domestic 
inputs and one for imported inputs. It also provides information on bilateral international trade by 
industry (including service trade). 
Original trade and input-output data come from national statistical offices, and hence its quality 
                                                     
25 Leontief (1936). 
26 Shoven and Wholley (1992). 
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depends on their quality.27 In spite of standardization efforts, statistical conventions differ among 
countries and some national statistical offices are too understaffed to produce reliable data. Making 
official data compatible with GTAP is difficult. Data exclusively on a single country, like input-output 
tables, are less reliable than trade data as they cannot benefit from double check with data from partner 
countries. Moreover, the GTAP team has imposed some assumptions in order to reconcile trade data. 
For example, it was necessary to interpolate some data on transport costs. 
Furthermore, the input-output data used in GTAP are often for distant years and are not 
systematically updated between versions. E.g. input-output data for Italy are for 1992, India for 
1994…28 As a consequence, comparisons between different years can be misleading as the underlining 
structure of the economy is assumed to stay the same.  
Lastly, reconciliation between input-output data and trade data is fraught with difficulty. Input-
output data bear the brunt of the changes necessary for reconciliation because they are less reliable 
than trade data. The shape of input-output tables can sometimes be dramatically changed, but this 
happens mainly for small countries or regional aggregates: usage shares change by an average of 71% 
for Cyprus, 51% for Malta, 38% for “rest of SADC” in GTAP 6. In contrast, usage shares change by 
an average of 5% or less for all G7 countries, India, China, Korea, Brazil… Still, some individual 
changes in Germany and the United States are important.29 
The GTAP team is conscious of such quality problems. Nevertheless, the database has been used 
by a network of more than 3,500 researchers for longer than a decade. The organisation of the GTAP 
project allows remarks to be systematically registered and integrated for the improvement of the 
database. The GTAP database is therefore a reference for experts and researchers in international 
trade.30 Still, all these defects make the GTAP database a markedly inferior source for the computation 
of vertical trade than the data used up to now in the existing literature. However, the originality of this 
                                                     
27 For example, we have stressed the importance of intra-firm trade. This kind of trade can bias our methodology 
if firms set their transfer prices in order to redirect their profits to countries where the tax burden is lower. 
According to IMF rules transfer prices must correspond to market prices in the country of origin and prices set 
by firms can be modified by customs and the tax authority. Some biases may however persist. 
28 See {Walmsley, 2008 #102}. 
29 McDougall (2006). 
30 For additional information, refer to http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu 
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paper is not to compute the value of vertical trade, but rather to re-allocate input trade flows to their 
initial producers. The only way to do that is to use reconciled input-output and trade data, and GTAP 
is the best source that provides this information, as recognized by the community of CGE economists. 
One can only hope better quality data will arise in time. 
2.2. Theoretical foundation of the calculation31  
In the context of a closed economy, equilibrium between output and final demand requires that 
output is equal to the sum of intermediate deliveries and of final demand. 
P=A*P + FD 
Where P is a vector of output for each product, FD a vector of final demand for each product, A a 
matrix of input coefficients taken from the intermediate deliveries matrix. It consists of elements aij, 
defined as the amount of product i required for the production of one unit of product j. 
This entails the following relation. This is a well-known result in input-output analysis which 
links the final demand of each product and production:  
 P =(I-A)-1*FD (1) 
Where I is the identity matrix. Each output vector P is itself associated with a value-added vector 
VA which gives each industry value-added required by the output vector. 
 VA=P – diag(P)A’I (2) 
Where diag(P) is the square matrix having the elements of P on its diagonal, A’ is the transpose of 
matrix A and i is the summation vector, a column vector filled by 1s.32 Hence, the value-added vector 
VA associated with the final demand vector FD is equal to: 
 VA = (I – A)-1∗FD – diag((I – A)-1∗FD)A’I (3) 
This can be extended to the international case of many inter-linked open economies. The world 
can be treated in the same way as a single economy where each sector in each country produces a 
specific product, which is produced nowhere else. There is an “extended” intermediate deliveries 
                                                     
31 This is extended in Daudin, Rifflart, Schweisguth, and Veroni (2006). 
32 This last relation is easier to understand if one keeps in mind that P-P*A is equal to the vector of total ouput 
not used as inputs for further production; this is not the same thing as value-added. 
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matrix G of dimension number of products*number of countries which gives the amount of product i 
from country m required per unit of product j in country n. G is similar to an usual domestic 
intermediate deliveries matrix where each pair product*producing country is treated as a different 
product or industry. 33 
As we have written (2) and (3), we can write:  
 VA = P – diag(P)G’i (4) 
 VA = (I – G)-1*FD – diag((I – G)-1FD)G’I (5) 
Where VA and P are vectors of dimension number of products*number of countries. This formula 
allows the computation of the value-added production (VA) linked to the consumption or investment of 
some final product (P). Practically, P is taken from trade and final usage statistics. It allows the 
computation of VA from which value-added trade values are extracted. 
2.3. Limitations 
2.3.1. Input-output coefficients 
However, the matrix G is unknown. As far as we know, no statistical institute diffuses such 
details. Data on whether inputs and final use goods are imported or domestic exist and are reported in 
GTAP though: they can be used to approximate G. This is what Hoen calls the “limited information 
multi-country input-output model”. 
The approximation is obtained, in the input-output tradition, by a fixed-proportion assumption. 
The assumption is that the share of each partner country in imported products is independent of its use 
(as a final demand item or as an intermediate consumption). This assumption means that the share of 
US grain is the same in imported grain used for final consumption in Mexico and imported grain used 
as inputs for Mexican food industry.34 This is a severe approximation, as the origin of inputs used in 
exports is probably different from the origin of inputs used in domestic consumption. Multinational 
firms producing in process-heavy countries, like China, are more likely to import more foreign goods 
as inputs and export more than the average of the industry. This is encouraged by the existence of 
                                                     
33 See Hoen (2002), pp. 51-58 for a discussion of this method and a formal discussion of the G matrix. 
34 This hypothesis is very common, and is used e.g. in Campa and Goldberg (1997) and Feenstra and Hanson 
(1997). 
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fiscal support to process activities, e.g. duty-drawbacks systems like in China and Vietnam or more 
generally “Export Processing Zones” (more than 3,500 exist in 130 countries35). This can also be 
encouraged by higher quality requirements in foreign markets. This issue has long been recognized36. 
It has been extensively studied in the case of China.37 Koopmans, Wang and Wei show that the 
method we use underestimates by 50% the amount of imported content in Chinese exports.38 
Implementing their method to China and other countries in our data would require using more detailed 
trade statistics than the ones available in GTAP. This extension is past the ambition of this paper.39 
Rather than trying to measure finely vertical trade, the ambition of this paper is to give a first 
approximation of the effects of re-allocating input trade to its original producer. It must be kept in 
mind that this paper underestimates vertical trade throughout, especially for developing Asian 
countries. 
2.3.2. Taking into account margin services 
Data on foreign trade flows also need some price amendments. Imported goods volumes are 
measured by GTAP — for example in the intermediate deliveries tables — in import prices. Such 
prices include production prices, transport costs, insurance costs as well as taxes levied on imports. 
However, to make the link between imports and production in the country of origin, we must measure 
volumes of imported goods used as intermediate deliveries or as final demand at production prices. To 
transform import prices into production prices, we apply a constant ratio along the different usage of 
different goods. This is equivalent to assuming that that goods originated from the same country and 
from the same industry bear the same transport cost and the same import duties whatever their use in 
the importing country. This seems reasonable, except that our industry aggregation is not very fine. 
The difference between import values and export – containing transport, maintenance and 
insurance costs and called margin services utilisation in the GTAP database. Ideally, we would like to 
                                                     
35 Singa Boyenge (2007). Countries with more than 500,000 workers in EPZs are: China (40 M), Indonesia (6 
M), Bengladesh (3.4 M), Mexico (1.2 M), Philippines (1.1 M), Vietnam (1 M), Pakistan (0.9 M), UAE (0.6 M) 
and South Africa (0.5 M). 
36 Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998). 
37 Chen, Cheng, Fung, and Lau (2005), Dean, Fung, and Whang (2007), Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). 
38 Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). 
39 It has been done in the case of China and Mexico in Johnson and Noguera (2009). 
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be able to allocate it to trade flows of the transport industry. However, there is no good way of doing 
that. The database does not indicate whether transport services linked to a trade flow were provided by 
a firm in the importing country, a firm in the exporting country or a firm in a third country. The only 
data available are the share of each country in the total supply of transport services linked to total 
international trade flows. We have therefore decided to exclude margin services trade from our 
computation. 
3. Value-added trade in general 
3.1. Comparing with previous measures 
Before developing our own results, we compare them with those found by Yi et alii. Our 
frameworks are very similar: we use the same definition of vertical trade and work from intermediate 
delivery matrices. However, they do not use reconciled trade / input-output data and cannot reallocate 
vertical trade flows to their original producers. As such, they do not compute value-added trade. 
Yi and alii calculated the share of imported of inputs, including inputs for inputs, in merchandise 
exports (VS) for 10 OECD countries and 4 emerging countries, using OECD input-output tables up to 
the end of the 1990s.40 For comparison purposes, we compute the same share using the same method 
for all the countries in our sample: our data cover 1997, 2001 and 2004. The results are given in Figure 
2. 
We do not diverge systematically in any way from the results by Yi and alii. Comparison is not 
possible for four countries, as the latest data from Yi and alii refers to before 1994 (Canada, Korea, 
Ireland and Italy). The difference between Yi and alii’s results and ours is larger than two percentage 
points for only three countries (Australia, Denmark and Taiwan). The difference is smaller than two 
percentage points for five countries which are all the largest traders in the dataset: France, Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Differences are not correlated with the amount of 
change imposed on Input-Output table by the trade / Input-Output reconciliation process, nor do they 
                                                     
40 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999) tables 2 and 3, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), pp 84-85, Chen, Kondratowicz, 
and Yi (2005), p 42, table 2. 
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seem to be linked with the origin of Input-Output tables in GTAP.41  
Figure 2: Share of imported inputs in merchandise exports: comparing our results to Yi 
and alii’s 
 
  
 
Sources: Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), Chen and alii (2005), authors’ calculations based on GTAP data for 
1997, 2001 and 2004. 
3.2. Value-added trade at the country level 
Table 1 gives some measures of vertical trade and value-added trade by continent. 
Table 1: Vertical trade per continent 
Country 
Import 
content of 
exports (VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further 
exports (VS1)
VS1/VS 
Exports 
consumed or 
invested 
domestically 
(VS1*) 
Share of 
vertical trade 
in total trade 
Ratio of 
standard 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
standard 
imports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
imports to 
GDP 
Asia 30% 27% 0,90 0,9% 33% 29% 26% 20% 17% 
America 18% 23% 1,24 5,1% 21% 13% 17% 10% 13% 
Europe 
and 
peripheries 
26% 25% 0,98 1,2% 27% 37% 36% 27% 26% 
Africa 17% 26% 1,54 0,3% 18% 37% 34% 31% 27% 
World 25% 25% 1,00 1,8% 27% 26% 26% 19% 19% 
 
 We will now go through this information in a cartographic way. The map might be difficult to 
                                                     
41 McDougall (2006), table 19-4. Walmsley and McDougall (2006), table 11.A.1. 
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read: all the data are presented in Table 7 (in appendix). Map 1 gives the share of imported inputs in 
total exports (VS) for each country in the world. The world mean is 25%. Exports of small countries 
have a bigger share of imported inputs. 40 % of exports in some Asian and European countries are 
imported inputs. 67 % of Singapore’s exports are. (Dutch and Hong Kong trade is already modified in 
GTAP to remove transit trade: this explains the relatively small values of their imported inputs in 
exports).42 
Map 1: Share of imported inputs in total exports (VS) 
 
Map 2 compares the ratio of exports that are further re-exported in partners’ exports (VS1) over 
imported inputs in exports (VS). As worldwide VS1 and VS are equivalent, the world mean is equal to 
one. It suggests a division between two types of participation in the international disintegration of the 
production process. Some countries take part through the production of inputs for further exports 
(identified when VS1 is broadly higher than VS):  primary producers (Former Soviet Union, Brunei, 
the Middle-East…) and producers of industrial inputs for processing countries (Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States…). Other countries are the final exporters of goods intensive in imported 
inputs (identified when VS is higher than VS1): Mexico, Canada, China, Eastern Europe and South-
East Asia. 
                                                     
42 Gehlhar (2006). 
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Map 2: VS1/VS by country 
 
The geographical repartition of the domestic content of consumed or invested imports (VS1*) is 
less interesting as our data and method underestimate it. Our method makes it correlated with the 
square of each country’s trade: this explains why VS1* is so important for the United States (8.9%) 
and for Germany (2.5%), Japan, United Kingdom, France, China … and has a world non-weighted 
mean of 0.4%.  
Map 3, finally, gives the share of vertical trade for each country. This is equal to the ratio 
between VS+VS1* and the mean of exports and imports. The world mean is 27%. 
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Map 3: Share of vertical trade in total trade 
 
Keeping this picture in mind is important to the answer of the question “who produces for whom” 
in the world economy. Standard trade statistics particularly overestimate the dependence of some 
countries on world trade for their own consumption and the demand of their products: this is the case 
for small open economies, China, some parts of Eastern Europe43…  
3.3. Industrial classification 
 Table 8 (in appendix) gives the share of imported inputs in exports (VS), the share of exports 
used as inputs for further exports (VS1), and value-added trade per industry. Table 2 gives an extract 
of these data.As expected, exports of raw materials and semi-finished products are very often used as 
inputs to further exports: VS1 is higher than 40% for plant fibres, minerals nec and metals. Finished 
goods are intensive in imported inputs: VS is higher than 30% for petroleum and coal products, 
electronic equipment, motor vehicles and parts exports. Electronic equipment has both a high VS and 
a high VS1, suggesting higher vertical specialization. 
                                                     
43 Because trade balances are not changed in value-added trade compared to standard trade: in absolute terms, 
differences in imports and exports between standard and value-added trade are exactly the same. 
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Table 2: Vertical trade per industry (2004) 
Sector Total exports (million $) 
Exports as a 
share of 
total exports 
Import 
content of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further exports 
(VS1) 
Value-added 
exports as a 
share of standard 
exports 
VA exports 
as a share of 
total VA 
exports 
VS1* as a 
share of 
value-added 
exports 
Exports 
as a 
share of 
VA 
VA exports 
as a share of 
VA 
Agriculture 238,548 2.4% 9% 13% 113% 3.7% 1.2% 19% 21% 
Raw materials 688,376 6.9% 6% 16% 98% 9.2% 1.3% 67% 65% 
Primary sector 926,925 9.2% 7% 15% 102% 12.9% 1.3% 40% 41% 
Farm industries 453,273 4.5% 13% 6% 40% 2.5% 1.1% 40% 16% 
Textiles and al. 561,222 5.6% 21% 14% 40% 3.1% 1.7% 108% 44% 
Wood and 
paper 361,023 3.6% 16% 16% 68% 3.4% 2.7% 41% 28% 
Chemicals and 
metals 1,971,153 19.7% 17% 22% 51% 13.8% 3.5% 87% 45% 
Metal and 
transport 
products 1,314,978 13.1% 19% 12% 42% 7.6% 3.5% 99% 42% 
Other 
manufactures 2,662,092 26.6% 32% 26% 40% 14.7% 2.6% 121% 48% 
Utilities 52,656 0.5% 10% 3% 186% 1.3% 3.2% 2% 4% 
Secondary 
sector 7,390,120 73.7% 19% 17% 47% 47.4% 2.9% 67% 32% 
Communication 
and trade 706,686 7.0% 13% 15% 182% 17.5% 2.4% 10% 17% 
Business 
services 726,690 7.2% 7% 15% 167% 16.6% 2.7% 10% 17% 
Other services 274,125 2.7% 5% 6% 120% 4.5% 1.5% 3% 3% 
Tertiary Sector 1,707,501 17.0% 9% 14% 166% 38.6% 2.4% 7% 11% 
Total 10,024,546 100.0% 16% 16% 73% 100.0% 2.5% 26% 19% 
 
At the industry level, value-added trade cannot be computed as total trade minus vertical trade. In 
addition to the “usual” vertical trade effect (imports used in exports), value-added trade is reallocated 
to its initial producer industry. As a result, some sectors have more value-added trade than they have 
export trade: that means they are mainly traded as inputs in other goods. This is especially strong for 
the tertiary sector: total value-added exports in business services are 67% higher than standard exports. 
This is also true for utilities and some agricultural raw materials. Industries with high share of VS or 
VS1 have a small value-added trade compared to standard trade (metal and transport products and 
“other manufactures”, including electronics). The value-added trade share of the secondary sector 
(47%) is much smaller than its share in standard trade (74%). On the other hand, the value-added trade 
share of the primary sector is higher: 13% against 9%. It is only the case for the value-added share of 
the tertiary sector: 39% against 17%. This is not a surprise and serves to check that our method gives 
the expected results. 
As mentioned earlier, VS1* is underestimated and dominated by the trade of the United States 
and other large economies. Yet, it is interesting to compare it to value-added trade: VS1* is especially 
high for chemical and metals, metal and transport products and other manufactures suggesting that 
 19
these industries produce goods as inputs for re-imported assembly production in other countries. 
Standard trade statistics give a wrong idea of the relative dependence on international demand of 
different sectors. Secondary exports are equal to 65% of secondary value-added, yet a large part of 
secondary exports are formed by embedded tertiary or primary value-added. As a result, secondary 
exports in value-added are equal to only 31% of secondary value-added. A contrario, tertiary exports 
in value-added are equal to 11% of tertiary value-added though tertiary exports are equal to only 7% 
of tertiary value-added. This must be taken into account to understand who produces for whom in the 
world economy. 
4. What role for vertical trade in regionalisation? 
To what extend did the fragmentation of production processes or the development of a final 
demand contribute to regionalisation? Table 3 shows some basic measures of the openness rate and the 
degree of regionalisation (measured as the ratio of regional exports on total exports) in the different 
regions of the world. According to these indicators, the most regionalized continent is Europe (69%). 
It is also the most open. The least regionalized one is Africa (10%). However, the ratio of regional 
trade on total trade is very sensitive to the size of the regions, the distance between trading partners 
and the dimension of the constituent countries, and therefore cannot be easily interpreted as a real 
measure of the intensity of regionalisation. For example, in America, regional trade would be greater if 
the US were split into fifty states.44 
Table 3: The extent of regionalisation and relative size of the regions, 2004∫45 
In % Europe America Asia Africa ROW World
Total exports as a share of GDP 35.9 13.4 29.4 37.3 42.0 26.1 
Total exports as a share of world exports 43.8 19.2 28.0 2.8 6.2 100.0 
Share of regional exports in total exports 69.1 50.6 47.1 9.5 11.3 100.0 
Share of regional exports in value-added exports 63.7 44.9 36.5 7.4 8.4 100.0 
 
 To go further than these rough measures of regionalization, we need to use a regionalisation 
indicator that is not affected by the size of different countries. A number of indicators have been 
                                                     
44 Iapadre (2006). 
45 Europe includes Turkey. ROW includes the former USSR (except the Baltic countries) and West Asia. 
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suggested to measure the “geographic neutrality” of trade. This paper generalizes to the bilateral case 
the symmetric trade introversion index used to measure regionalisation by Ledio Iapadre and the 
Regional Integration Knowledge System of the United Nation University of Bruges.46 We call the 
resulting index the “Trade Intensity Bilateral Index” between region i and region j. TIBIij ranges 
between -1 and 1. -1 means that region i does not export at all to region j. 1 means that regions i 
exports only to region j. 0 means that exports from region i to region j respect geographical neutrality. 
TIBIii is equal to the STJi which measures the amount of regionalization for region i. Its exact 
construction in explained in appendix.  
Table 4 shows TIBI between continents when measured in standard trade. The trade of all 
continents is regionalized. European trade is the most regionalized. At the other end of the scale, trade 
between Europe on the one hand and Asia and the America in the other hand is particularly small. 
Asia and America trade more with each other than they do with Europe. 
Table 4: Trade Intensity Bilateral Index of standard exports, 200447 
  To Europe To America To Asia To Africa To ROW 
From Europe 0.74 -0.54 -0.65 0.04 0.07 
From America -0.52 0.66 -0.15 -0.20 -0.21 
From Asia -0.60 0.03 0.66 -0.16 -0.13 
From Africa 0.03 -0.05 -0.15 0.63 -0.18 
From ROW -0.25 -0.28 0.31 0.13 0.45 
Table 5 gives the same information for value-added trade.  
Table 5: Trade Intensity Bilateral Index of value-added exports, 2004 
  To Europe To America To Asia To Africa To ROW 
From Europe 0.63 -0.45 -0.53 0.03 0.07 
From America -0.41 0.50 -0.04 -0.14 -0.13 
From Asia -0.48 0.13 0.49 -0.12 -0.07 
From Africa 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.49 -0.17 
From ROW -0.21 -0.19 0.32 0.11 0.25 
Table 6 is the difference between Table 4 and Table 5. A negative (positive) difference means 
that the share of value-added bilateral exports in this region’s total value-added exports is smaller 
(resp. larger) than the share of standard bilateral exports in this region’s total standard exports. A 
negative (positive) difference in Table 6 implies that this particular trade flow is particularly intensive 
                                                     
46 They name this index STJ. See Iapadre (2006) , p. 71 and http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks. 
47 The definition of each continent is dependent on the available data (see subsequent tables). Trade inside GTAP 
regions is not taken into account. 
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(non-intensive) in vertical trade. This can come from difference in VS (re-exported imports), VS1 
(exports used as inputs for further re-exports) or VS1* (exports used as inputs for further re-exports in 
the original production country). 
Table 6: Difference between the TIBI of value-added exports and the TIBI of standard exports, 
2004 
  To Europe To America To Asia To Africa To ROW 
From Europe -0.11 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.00 
From America 0.11 -0.16 0.11 0.06 0.08 
From Asia 0.12 0.10 -0.17 0.04 0.06 
From Africa -0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.14 0.01 
From ROW 0.04 0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.20 
 
Table 6 shows a general reversion to the mean, with the interesting exception of Asian exports to 
America. When trade intensity is positive in standard trade, it is reduced in value-added trade. When 
trade intensity is negative in standard trade, it is increased in value-added trade. World value-added 
trade is more geographic neutral. This is expected, as vertical trade is more sensitive to trade barriers.  
Table 6 shows a negative difference for all intra-regional trade and a positive difference for nearly 
all extra-regional trade (except between Europe and Africa). That confirms that a relatively large share 
of regional trade is actually trade in inputs between countries involved in different stages of the 
production process for final consumption elsewhere. Considering past studies on the nature of Asian 
regionalisation, one would expect Asian regional value-added trade intensity to be much smaller than 
Asian regional standard trade intensity.48 This is indeed the case, but not much more so than in 
America or Africa. The real outlier seems to be Europe: the slicing of the supply chain is less 
advanced there. 
Past studies on Asian exports have also shown that America is an important final market for 
Asian goods: one would also expect that Asian value-added exports to America are relatively more 
important than Asia standard exports to America. Both of these are confirmed by Table 6, to the extent 
than exports from Asia to America are a striking exception to the general reversion to the mean 
between Table 5 and Table 6. They are even less geographic neutral in value-added trade than in 
                                                     
48 Athukorala and Yamashita (2006). 
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standard trade, suggesting a strong dependence of Asian on American consumption. What is more 
original to this research is that Asia does not seem very exceptional in these regard, as the TIBI index 
is increased by a similar amount for all the trade between the Triad. The only intercontinental trade 
that is less intensive in value-added than in standard measures is between Europe and Africa. 
Dividing the world into four a priori regions is a bit blunt. Table 9, Table 10, Table 11 give the 
same information for a finer regional classification. This allows a clearer view on which regions are 
integrated. E.g. African regionalisation excludes North Africa, which is more integrated with the 
Eurozone. The highest case of geographic non-neutrality is for trade between the USA and its NAFTA 
partners, but it is less striking in value-added trade than in standard trade. Austral Africa and South 
America are the next most introverted regions. The regions for which standard trade gives the most 
distorted answer to the question “who produces for whom” (measured as the mean of the absolute 
changes in TIBI between value-added trade and standard trade) are Sub-Saharan Africa excluding 
Austral Africa; Asia excluding China and Australasia; Eastern Europe; and Canada and Mexico. 
Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the debate concerning globalization, vertical trade and regionalization. 
Since the end of the 1980s, globalization is tied to the development of new international production 
processes based on a new international division of labour. In this context, it appears more and more 
difficult to understand the international division of labour with standard trade statistics. If one wants to 
understand the international production process enough to be able to answer the question “who 
produces what and for whom?”, one must reallocate the value-added contained in trade in final goods 
to each country participating to its production. We do this using the GTAP database for 1997, 2001 
and 2004. 
The most obvious way to improve the results of this paper would be to improve the data it uses. 
The quality of the GTAP database is certainly difficult to improve upon. However, we have made a 
simplifying assumption that might have important consequences. We have assumed that, inside each 
sector, all production had the same imported content and the same pattern of use. As it is obvious in 
the case of multi-national firms affiliates, inside sectors, some firms are more intensive in imported 
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inputs and export more than other. Taking this into account would increase our estimate of vertical 
trade and hence decrease our estimate of value-added trade. By making its assumptions, this paper has 
under-estimated the effect of the international fragmentation of production on the patterns of the 
international division of labour.  
Still, our results are worth commenting. For the first time, we study the effect of vertical trade on 
trade patterns for a database covering the entire world and the whole range of industries. Our results 
are compatible with past results by Yi and his co-authors. We go further, computing the share of 
imported inputs in exports (VS), the share of export used as inputs to further exports (VS1), the 
domestic content of imports (VS1*) and value-added trade for 113 countries or groups of countries 
and 55 sectors. The estimations have shortcoming. Yet, they have important consequences for the 
answer to the question “who produces for whom in the world economy”. Services are much more 
dependent on external demand that the standard trade statistics suggest. Standard trade statistics give a 
wrong idea of the relative dependence on international demand of different sectors. Despite the fact 
that industrial exports are equal to 67% of industrial value-added, a large part of these exports embed 
tertiary or primary productions. As a result, only 32% of the world industrial value-added is actually 
consumed by foreign consumers. A contrario, 11% of the world service value-added is consumed by 
foreign consumers compared to service exports equal to only 7% of value-added. Looking at value-
added trade decreases the amount of regionalization of world trade. For example, this paper confirms 
that Asia relies more heavily on extra-regional final markets than standard trade statistics suggest. This 
is also the case for America and Africa. European regionalization, though the highest among the four 
continents, is the less dependent on vertical specialization trade. 
Appendix 
Constructing the Trade Intensity Bilateral Index (TIBI) 
Let us start with the index developed by the CEPII based on research on the structure of world 
trade in the 1960s and the 1970s: relative bilateral intensity of exports.49 Its logic is similar to 
                                                     
49 See Deutsch and Savage (1960), Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), Freudenberg, Gaulier, and Ûnal-Kensenci 
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Balassa’s index of comparative advantages.50 It is equal to: 
 Relative Export Intensityij (REIij) = (Xij/ Xi.)/ (X.j/X) (6) 
Where Xij are the exports from region i to region j, X are total world exports, Xi. are total exports 
from region i and X.j are total exports to region j. REIij is the ratio between the share of exports to 
region j in the total exports of region i (Xij/ Xi. = Sij) and the share of exports to region j in total world 
exports (X.j/X=Wj). All REIij would be equal to one if all exports respected geographical neutrality, 
i.e. if exports from region i to region j were simply a function of the value of exports from region i and 
the value of exports to region j and no other factors (distance, currency union, free trade areas, 
common languages, colonial ties) played any role in determining bilateral world trade.51 
Iapadre has shown that this kind of index has three problems: range variability, range asymmetry 
and dynamic ambiguity. We follow his solutions to solve them. 
Range variability means that the maximum value of the index depends on the size of the regions 
under study. To solve that issue, we replace the denominator by the share of exports to region j in total 
exports from all non-i regions (the “rest of the world”) rather than in total world exports. 
 I1ij = (Xij/ Xi.)/ (Xrj/Xr.) (7) 
Where Xrj is the amount of exports to region j in exports from the rest of the world excluding 
region i and Xr. is the total exports of the rest of the world excluding region i. Xrj/Xr. is the share of 
exports to region j in exports from the rest of the world excluding region i. Now the index can take any 
value from 0 to infinity. 
Range asymmetry means that range is not symmetric around neutrality. I1 ranges from 0 to 1 if 
trade is less important than expected and from 1 to infinity if trade is more important than expected. 
To solve that issue, we use the following index, which varies between -1 and 1 and has neutrality at 0 
rather than 1. 
 I2ij = (I1ij-1)/(I1ij+1) (8) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1998), p. 66-68, Gaulier, Jean, and Ünal-Kesenci (2004)  
50 Balassa (1965). 
51 This is similar to the definition offered by Frankel in Frankel (1998). Yet, this measure does not correct for 
distance to measure regionalization. Looking at REI is similar to bilateral residual in a “gravity” equation using 
only exporter and importer dummies as explanatory variables to trade. 
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Dynamic ambiguity means that a change in the index might be in the same direction as the 
change in the complementary index measuring the intensity of trade between the region i and all non-j 
regions. To solve that issue, we first define this complementary index. 
 I3ij = (1-(Xij/ Xi.))/(1-(Xrj/Xr.)) (10) 
And we study as the “basic” index the ratio between I1 and I3, which we transform to correct for 
range asymmetry. Our final index, the “Trade Intensity Bilateral Index” is equal to: 
 TIBIij = (I1ij/ I3ij-1)/ (I1ij/ I3ij+1) (11) 
TIBIij ranges between -1 and 1. -1 means that region i does not export at all to region j. 1 means 
that regions i exports only to region j. 0 means that exports from region i to region j respect 
geographical neutrality. TIBIii is equal to the symmetric trade introversion index which measures the 
amount of regionalization for region i.52 
Table 7: Vertical trade per country 
Country 
Import 
content of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports 
used as 
inputs for 
further 
exports 
(VS1) 
VS1/VS 
Exports 
consumed or 
invested 
domestically 
(VS1*) 
Share of 
vertical trade 
in total trade 
Ratio of 
standard 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
standard 
imports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
imports to 
GDP 
Australia 13% 28% 2.13 0.6% 13% 18% 19% 15% 17% 
New Zealand 18% 16% 0.90 0.2% 19% 30% 29% 25% 23% 
 Rest of Oceania 27% 25% 0.92 0.1% 23% 42% 58% 31% 46% 
China 30% 22% 0.73 1.4% 33% 40% 34% 28% 22% 
Hong Kong 30% 22% 0.74 0.3% 32% 79% 68% 55% 44% 
Japan 13% 29% 2.29 2.6% 16% 14% 11% 12% 9% 
Korea 37% 29% 0.77 0.5% 40% 44% 38% 27% 21% 
Taiwan 43% 31% 0.73 0.3% 48% 73% 56% 41% 25% 
Rest of East Asia 21% 17% 0.83 0.0% 25% 53% 34% 42% 23% 
Cambodia 39% 10% 0.25 0.0% 45% 87% 61% 53% 28% 
Indonesia 21% 29% 1.38 0.5% 24% 35% 30% 27% 22% 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 27% 23% 0.87 0.0% 23% 27% 36% 20% 29% 
Myanmar 18% 27% 1.55 0.1% 17% 40% 41% 33% 34% 
Malaysia 42% 32% 0.77 0.4% 51% 133% 89% 77% 33% 
Philippines 43% 34% 0.80 0.1% 44% 61% 57% 35% 31% 
Singapore 67% 32% 0.48 0.1% 66% 173% 179% 56% 62% 
Thailand 40% 27% 0.67 0.2% 44% 75% 61% 45% 31% 
Vietnam 38% 20% 0.53 0.2% 37% 74% 80% 46% 51% 
Rest of Southeast 
Asia 18% 26% 1.48 0.0% 26% 88% 32% 72% 16% 
Bangladesh 25% 12% 0.47 0.0% 24% 19% 22% 15% 17% 
India 19% 22% 1.16 0.3% 17% 16% 20% 13% 16% 
Pakistan 18% 19% 1.02 0.0% 14% 18% 28% 15% 25% 
Sri Lanka 35% 14% 0.41 0.0% 31% 37% 46% 24% 33% 
Rest of South Asia 21% 18% 0.90 0.0% 14% 21% 38% 16% 34% 
Asia 30% 27% 0.90 0.9% 33% 29% 26% 20% 17% 
 
                                                     
52 Iapadre (2006), p. 71, http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks. 
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Country 
Import 
content of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further 
exports (VS1) 
VS1/VS 
Exports 
consumed or 
invested 
domestically 
(VS1*) 
Share of 
vertical trade 
in total trade 
Ratio of 
standard 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
standard 
imports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
imports to 
GDP 
Canada 29% 14% 0.47 0.9% 31% 35% 33% 25% 23% 
United States of 
America 14% 28% 1.93 5.9% 19% 9% 14% 7% 12% 
Mexico 27% 13% 0.48 0.6% 28% 31% 30% 23% 21% 
Rest of North 
America 38% 20% 0.52 0.0% 14% 19% 85% 12% 77% 
Argentina 16% 21% 1.31 0.3% 19% 28% 18% 24% 14% 
Bolivia 14% 25% 1.76 0.1% 15% 29% 27% 25% 23% 
Brazil 13% 22% 1.67 0.6% 16% 20% 14% 17% 11% 
Chile 22% 30% 1.37 0.1% 25% 43% 33% 34% 24% 
Colombia 14% 19% 1.39 0.1% 14% 21% 19% 18% 17% 
Ecuador 11% 16% 1.55 0.1% 11% 34% 30% 31% 26% 
Paraguay 16% 29% 1.76 0.1% 18% 52% 41% 44% 32% 
Peru 7% 28% 3.93 0.1% 8% 20% 16% 18% 15% 
Uruguay 31% 18% 0.56 0.0% 30% 34% 37% 23% 26% 
Venezuela 11% 21% 1.98 0.2% 14% 33% 17% 30% 14% 
Rest of South 
America 24% 35% 1.42 0.0% 26% 70% 63% 53% 46% 
Costa Rica 32% 20% 0.64 0.0% 37% 62% 44% 42% 25% 
Guatemala 20% 13% 0.65 0.1% 16% 20% 32% 16% 27% 
Nicaragua 26% 10% 0.40 0.0% 21% 43% 61% 32% 50% 
Panama 16% 19% 1.20 0.0% 16% 30% 31% 25% 26% 
Rest of Central 
America 27% 11% 0.41 0.1% 24% 40% 51% 29% 40% 
Caribbean 22% 21% 0.91 0.1% 20% 26% 33% 20% 27% 
America 18% 23% 1.24 5.1% 21% 13% 17% 10% 13% 
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Country 
Import 
content of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further 
exports (VS1) 
VS1/VS 
Exports 
consumed or 
invested 
domestically 
(VS1*) 
Share of 
vertical trade 
in total trade 
Ratio of 
standard 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
standard 
imports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
imports to 
GDP 
Austria 30% 26% 0.87 0.5% 29% 56% 59% 39% 42% 
Belgium 56% 24% 0.43 0.3% 53% 78% 87% 34% 43% 
Cyprus 23% 20% 0.84 0.0% 22% 46% 49% 35% 39% 
Czech Republic 39% 27% 0.71 0.3% 38% 71% 72% 43% 45% 
Denmark 24% 23% 0.94 0.4% 25% 48% 44% 37% 33% 
Estonia 45% 26% 0.58 0.1% 42% 99% 115% 54% 70% 
Finland 33% 26% 0.77 0.3% 36% 44% 38% 29% 23% 
France 21% 24% 1.15 1.8% 23% 27% 28% 21% 22% 
Germany 23% 25% 1.07 2.9% 28% 39% 34% 29% 24% 
Greece 21% 23% 1.09 0.2% 18% 26% 37% 21% 31% 
Hungary 48% 25% 0.51 0.1% 48% 65% 68% 34% 36% 
Ireland 34% 27% 0.78 0.2% 41% 102% 70% 67% 35% 
Italy 27% 22% 0.82 0.9% 27% 25% 26% 18% 19% 
Latvia 36% 25% 0.71 0.1% 27% 38% 62% 24% 48% 
Lithuania 38% 24% 0.63 0.1% 34% 47% 60% 29% 42% 
Luxembourg 67% 27% 0.41 0.0% 64% 129% 143% 42% 56% 
Malta 36% 28% 0.79 0.0% 38% 102% 92% 65% 55% 
Netherlands 27% 25% 0.94 0.6% 28% 47% 46% 34% 33% 
Poland 26% 25% 0.96 0.3% 24% 37% 44% 27% 34% 
Portugal 26% 21% 0.82 0.2% 23% 32% 41% 23% 32% 
Slovakia 42% 28% 0.67 0.2% 43% 69% 66% 40% 36% 
Slovenia 37% 25% 0.66 0.1% 37% 55% 56% 35% 35% 
Spain 22% 21% 0.96 0.8% 21% 27% 32% 21% 26% 
Sweden 23% 25% 1.08 0.6% 26% 43% 36% 33% 26% 
United Kingdom 18% 26% 1.43 1.5% 18% 25% 31% 20% 26% 
Switzerland 34% 25% 0.75 0.3% 38% 48% 40% 31% 23% 
Norway 14% 33% 2.30 0.5% 17% 39% 28% 33% 23% 
Rest of EFTA 29% 23% 0.79 0.0% 28% 44% 49% 31% 36% 
Albania 22% 22% 1.01 0.0% 14% 19% 41% 15% 36% 
Bulgaria 39% 23% 0.59 0.0% 36% 53% 62% 32% 42% 
Belarus 58% 21% 0.36 0.1% 54% 56% 65% 23% 33% 
Croatia 28% 21% 0.74 0.1% 26% 47% 56% 34% 43% 
Romania 30% 23% 0.78 0.1% 27% 37% 46% 26% 35% 
Russian Federation 11% 38% 3.43 2.1% 14% 32% 25% 28% 20% 
Ukraine 36% 27% 0.77 0.2% 35% 60% 61% 38% 39% 
Rest of Eastern 
Europe 46% 17% 0.36 0.0% 33% 60% 108% 32% 81% 
Rest of Europe 30% 25% 0.84 0.1% 20% 26% 53% 18% 45% 
Kazakhstan 18% 36% 1.98 0.2% 20% 49% 41% 40% 32% 
Kyrgyzstan 30% 31% 1.05 0.0% 25% 52% 72% 37% 57% 
Rest of Former 
Soviet Union 16% 38% 2.32 0.3% 20% 57% 38% 47% 29% 
Armenia 34% 25% 0.75 0.0% 25% 29% 48% 19% 39% 
Azerbaijan 16% 31% 1.91 0.0% 11% 45% 86% 38% 79% 
Georgia 24% 24% 1.01 0.0% 17% 33% 60% 25% 53% 
Iran, Islamic 
Republic of 5% 34% 7.28 0.3% 5% 29% 25% 28% 23% 
Turkey 23% 20% 0.88 0.2% 22% 28% 33% 22% 26% 
Rest of Western 
Asia 16% 28% 1.79 0.9% 19% 49% 38% 41% 30% 
Europe and  misc. 26% 25% 0.98 1.2% 27% 37% 36% 27% 26% 
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Country 
Import 
content of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further 
exports (VS1) 
VS1/VS 
Exports 
consumed or 
invested 
domestically 
(VS1*) 
Share of 
vertical trade 
in total trade 
Ratio of 
standard 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
standard 
imports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
exports to 
GDP 
Ratio of 
value-added 
imports to 
GDP 
Egypt 21% 20% 0.96 0.0% 21% 29% 29% 23% 23% 
Morocco 23% 17% 0.75 0.0% 22% 36% 39% 27% 31% 
Tunisia 31% 18% 0.59 0.1% 30% 48% 50% 33% 36% 
Rest of North 
Africa 8% 31% 3.78 0.3% 10% 42% 29% 38% 26% 
Nigeria 6% 24% 3.71 0.4% 9% 57% 31% 53% 27% 
Senegal 27% 19% 0.68 0.0% 19% 27% 52% 20% 45% 
Rest of Western 
Africa 24% 25% 1.05 0.1% 20% 37% 54% 28% 45% 
Rest of Central 
Africa 8% 31% 3.82 0.1% 10% 36% 23% 33% 20% 
Rest of South 
Central Africa 15% 29% 1.95 0.1% 16% 57% 54% 49% 45% 
Ethiopia 24% 18% 0.78 0.0% 15% 25% 54% 19% 48% 
Madagascar 25% 18% 0.69 0.0% 28% 47% 38% 35% 26% 
Malawi 29% 19% 0.65 0.0% 24% 44% 61% 31% 48% 
Mauritius 30% 19% 0.65 0.0% 31% 73% 67% 51% 45% 
Mozambique 24% 40% 1.66 0.0% 24% 36% 37% 27% 28% 
Tanzania 20% 23% 1.15 0.0% 16% 21% 33% 16% 29% 
Uganda 19% 27% 1.44 0.0% 18% 25% 27% 21% 22% 
Zambia 22% 48% 2.18 0.1% 23% 39% 36% 30% 28% 
Zimbabwe 30% 29% 0.95 0.1% 32% 57% 53% 39% 35% 
Rest of Eastern 
Africa 15% 20% 1.38 0.1% 12% 22% 31% 19% 28% 
Botswana 12% 26% 2.17 0.1% 13% 48% 39% 42% 33% 
South Africa 19% 28% 1.48 0.9% 21% 30% 27% 24% 21% 
Rest of South 
African Customs 
Union 31% 20% 0.65 0.2% 35% 76% 62% 52% 39% 
Africa 17% 26% 1.54 0.3% 18% 37% 34% 31% 27% 
World 25% 25% 1.00 1.8% 27% 26% 26% 19% 19% 
Sources: GTAP 7. Authors’ computations 
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Table 8: Vertical trade per industry 
Sector 
Total 
exports 
(million $) 
Exports 
as a share 
of total 
exports 
Import 
content of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further 
exports (VS1) 
Value-added 
exports as a 
share of 
standard 
exports 
VA exports 
as a share of 
total VA 
exports 
VS1* as a 
share of 
value-added 
exports 
Exports 
as a 
share of 
VA 
VA 
exports 
as a 
share of 
VA 
Paddy rice  1,455 0.0% 10% 33% 507% 0.1% 0.7% 2% 11% 
Wheat  20,845 0.2% 10% 14% 65% 0.2% 1.5% 46% 30% 
Cereal grains nec  18,138 0.2% 9% 11% 74% 0.2% 1.5% 27% 20% 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts  68,098 0.7% 7% 5% 91% 0.8% 0.6% 19% 17% 
Oil seeds  23,290 0.2% 7% 15% 100% 0.3% 1.4% 38% 38% 
Sugar cane, sugar beet  78 0.0% 7% 16% 4730% 0.1% 0.6% 0% 15% 
Plant-based fibers  11,296 0.1% 10% 29% 111% 0.2% 2.7% 36% 41% 
Crops nec  40,482 0.4% 11% 18% 100% 0.6% 0.9% 27% 27% 
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, 
horses  
6,855 0.1% 12% 10% 189% 0.2% 1.0% 11% 20% 
Animal products nec  18,393 0.2% 14% 19% 110% 0.3% 1.2% 14% 15% 
Raw milk  290 0.0% 8% 9% 2931% 0.1% 0.7% 0% 12% 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons  2,210 0.0% 15% 51% 121% 0.0% 1.0% 33% 40% 
Forestry  12,998 0.1% 7% 21% 263% 0.5% 1.6% 13% 33% 
Fishing  14,119 0.1% 7% 8% 105% 0.2% 1.1% 17% 17% 
Agriculture 238,548 2.4% 9% 13% 113% 3.7% 1.2% 19% 21% 
Coal  31,573 0.3% 7% 20% 114% 0.5% 2.4% 35% 40% 
Oil  484,089 4.8% 6% 15% 98% 6.5% 1.0% 74% 72% 
Gas  71,871 0.7% 7% 19% 108% 1.1% 1.7% 58% 62% 
Minerals nec  100,844 1.0% 5% 16% 86% 1.2% 2.0% 64% 55% 
Raw materials 688,376 6.9% 6% 16% 98% 9.2% 1.3% 67% 65% 
Primary sector 926,925 9.2% 7% 15% 102% 12.9% 1.3% 40% 41% 
Bovine meat products  27,371 0.3% 13% 7% 34% 0.1% 1.3% 45% 15% 
Meat products nec  40,855 0.4% 16% 7% 30% 0.2% 1.2% 67% 20% 
Vegetable oils and fats  44,009 0.4% 8% 5% 32% 0.2% 0.8% 131% 42% 
Dairy products  43,036 0.4% 14% 6% 37% 0.2% 1.2% 36% 13% 
Processed rice  8,083 0.1% 9% 4% 33% 0.0% 0.6% 27% 9% 
Sugar  12,784 0.1% 10% 9% 43% 0.1% 0.8% 44% 19% 
Food products nec  202,230 2.0% 15% 7% 42% 1.2% 1.3% 38% 16% 
Beverages and tobacco 
products  
74,905 0.7% 11% 4% 50% 0.5% 0.7% 28% 14% 
Farm industries 453,273 4.5% 13% 6% 40% 2.5% 1.1% 40% 16% 
Textiles  263,857 2.6% 20% 22% 48% 1.7% 2.5% 98% 47% 
Wearing apparel  194,963 1.9% 21% 5% 33% 0.9% 0.6% 108% 36% 
Leather products  102,403 1.0% 22% 11% 34% 0.5% 1.2% 150% 50% 
Textiles and al. 561,222 5.6% 21% 14% 40% 3.1% 1.7% 108% 44% 
Wood products  168,103 1.7% 16% 13% 51% 1.2% 2.2% 63% 32% 
Paper products, publishing  192,921 1.9% 16% 20% 83% 2.2% 3.0% 31% 26% 
Wood and paper 361,023 3.6% 16% 16% 68% 3.4% 2.7% 41% 28% 
Petroleum, coal products  198,883 2.0% 22% 14% 33% 0.9% 1.7% 114% 38% 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products  
1,172,718 11.7% 16% 21% 50% 8.0% 3.9% 93% 47% 
Mineral products nec  105,226 1.0% 18% 23% 72% 1.0% 2.6% 34% 24% 
Ferrous metals  247,962 2.5% 14% 24% 65% 2.2% 3.4% 76% 50% 
Metals nec  246,364 2.5% 17% 31% 47% 1.6% 3.3% 131% 62% 
Chemicals and metals 1,971,153 19.7% 17% 22% 51% 13.8% 3.5% 87% 45% 
Metal products  192,339 1.9% 15% 19% 81% 2.1% 4.3% 40% 33% 
Motor vehicles and parts  865,977 8.6% 19% 10% 34% 4.0% 3.4% 139% 47% 
Transport equipment nec  256,662 2.6% 20% 13% 42% 1.5% 2.5% 111% 47% 
Metal and transport 
products 
1,314,978 13.1% 19% 12% 42% 7.6% 3.5% 99% 42% 
Electronic equipment  1,104,466 11.0% 28% 24% 34% 5.1% 2.4% 173% 59% 
Machinery and equipment nec  1,376,467 13.7% 19% 16% 44% 8.3% 2.9% 107% 47% 
Manufactures nec  181,159 1.8% 25% 14% 48% 1.2% 1.2% 66% 32% 
Other manufactures 2,662,092 26.6% 23% 19% 40% 14.6% 2.6% 121% 48% 
Electricity  27,445 0.3% 12% 20% 591% 2.2% 2.4% 4% 23% 
Gas manufacture, distribution  5,658 0.1% 3% 9% 301% 0.2% 3.7% 6% 18% 
Water  1,999 0.0% 7% 11% 750% 0.2% 3.3% 1% 11% 
Construction  44,998 0.4% 11% 2% 146% 0.9% 3.0% 2% 3% 
Utilities 52,656 0.5% 10% 3% 186% 1.3% 3.2% 2% 4% 
Secondary sector 7,390,120 73.7% 19% 17% 47% 47.4% 2.9% 67% 32% 
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Sector 
Total 
exports 
(million $) 
Exports 
as a share 
of total 
exports 
Import 
content 
of 
exports 
(VS) 
Exports used 
as inputs for 
further 
exports 
(VS1) 
Value-added 
exports as a 
share of 
standard 
exports 
VA exports 
as a share 
of total VA 
exports 
VS1* as a 
share of 
value-
added 
exports 
Exports 
as a 
share of 
VA 
VA exports 
as a share 
of VA 
Trade  210,328 2.1% 11% 16% 368% 10.6% 2.7% 4% 15% 
Transports  435,559 4.3% 15% 15% 88% 5.2% 2.2% 30% 26% 
Communication  60,798 0.6% 7% 12% 211% 1.7% 1.9% 7% 15% 
Communication and trade 706,686 7.0% 13% 15% 182% 17.5% 2.4% 10% 17% 
Financial services nec  109,050 1.1% 6% 13% 215% 3.2% 3.2% 6% 14% 
Insurance  85,016 0.8% 6% 10% 81% 0.9% 2.0% 16% 13% 
Business services nec  532,625 5.3% 7% 17% 171% 12.4% 2.6% 11% 19% 
Business services 726,690 7.2% 7% 15% 167% 16.6% 2.7% 10% 17% 
Recreational and other 
services  111,833 1.1% 7% 12% 105% 1.6% 1.5% 10% 10% 
Public Administration, Defense, 
Education, Health  162,292 1.6% 5% 2% 126% 2.8% 1.5% 2% 3% 
Dwellings 0 0.0%    0.1% 0.9% 0% 0% 
Other services 274,125 2.7% 5% 6% 120% 4.5% 1.5% 3% 3% 
Tertiary Sector 1,707,501 17.0% 9% 14% 166% 38.6% 2.4% 7% 11% 
Total 10,024,546 100.0% 16% 16% 73% 100.0% 2.5% 26% 19% 
Sources: GTAP 7. Authors’ computations 
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Table 9: Standard TIBI 
 Europe America Asia Africa ROW
 
Exports         To 
From 
Euro 
Zone 
Eastern 
Europe North 
United 
States 
Other 
NAFTA
Rest of 
America Japan
China 
and HK
Rest of 
East 
Asia 
Rest of 
Asia North Austral 
Sub-
Sahara
n  
Euro Zone53 0.50 0.41 0.42 -0.44 -0.66 -0.29 -0.57 -0.52 -0.57 -0.37 0.33 -0.11 0.02 0.00 
Eastern Europe54 0.42 0.60 0.06 -0.52 -0.69 -0.49 -0.65 -0.70 -0.67 -0.55 0.08 -0.38 -0.27 0.31 
Northern 
Europe55 0.34 -0.02 0.18 -0.13 -0.41 -0.23 -0.27 -0.44 -0.41 -0.02 -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 
United States -0.31 -0.47 -0.09 NA 0.91 0.43 0.27 -0.11 0.12 0.01 -0.09 -0.21 -0.06 -0.04 
Rest of NAFTA56 -0.78 -0.80 -0.54 0.92 -0.49 0.01 -0.47 -0.57 -0.67 -0.55 -0.59 -0.67 -0.58 -0.67 
Rest of America57 -0.28 -0.43 -0.28 0.37 0.05 0.78 -0.17 -0.15 -0.31 -0.36 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.14 
Japan -0.47 -0.52 -0.41 0.23 -0.32 -0.21 NA 0.54 0.60 0.07 -0.35 -0.12 -0.21 -0.13 
China and Hong-
Kong -0.34 -0.47 -0.27 0.30 -0.21 -0.14 0.52 0.01 0.25 0.10 -0.27 -0.17 -0.01 -0.12 
Rest of East Asia58 -0.52 -0.47 -0.40 0.03 -0.44 -0.29 0.38 0.67 0.46 0.21 -0.38 -0.25 -0.01 -0.21 
Rest of Asia59 -0.38 -0.50 -0.10 -0.01 -0.40 -0.25 0.37 0.12 0.22 0.59 -0.05 0.18 0.29 0.24 
Northern Africa60 0.46 0.11 -0.28 -0.05 -0.42 -0.05 -0.45 -0.56 -0.58 -0.30 0.48 -0.57 0.08 -0.12 
Austral Africa61 -0.18 -0.37 0.24 -0.28 -0.56 -0.36 0.07 -0.29 -0.16 0.23 -0.32 0.94 0.72 -0.09 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa62 -0.11 -0.56 -0.33 0.32 -0.71 0.20 -0.13 0.15 -0.23 0.48 -0.15 0.49 0.55 -0.30 
ROW63 -0.23 0.22 -0.39 -0.14 -0.72 -0.29 0.41 -0.10 0.25 0.38 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.45 
*Intra-continental trade is coloured. 
Source: GTAP 7. authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                     
53 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain. 
54 Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Rumania, Turkey, Rest of Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe. 
55 Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Rest of EFTA  
56 Canada and Mexico 
57 Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa-Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Rest of North America, Rest of South America, Caribbean. 
58 Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Other East 
Asia. 
59 Australia, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Rest of 
Oceania, Rest of South Asia. 
60 Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa 
61 Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of South African Customs Union. 
62 Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Rest of West Africa, Rest of 
Central Africa, Rest of East Africa, Rest of South-Central Africa. 
63 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Rest of former 
Soviet Union, Rest of West Asia 
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 Table 10: Value-added TIBI 
Exports         To 
From 
Europe America Asia Africa ROW
 
Euro 
Zone East North 
United 
States
Other 
NAFTA
Rest of 
America Japan
China+
HK 
Rest of 
East 
Asia 
Rest of 
Asia North 
Austr
al 
Sub-
Saharan  
Euro Zone 0.41 0.36 0.36 -0.36 -0.58 -0.25 -0.48 -0.41 -0.46 -0.31 0.26 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 
Eastern Europe 0.37 0.50 0.08 -0.42 -0.60 -0.40 -0.51 -0.55 -0.52 -0.43 0.08 -0.29 -0.21 0.28 
Northern Europe 0.28 0.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.35 -0.20 -0.24 -0.34 -0.31 -0.05 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
United States -0.22 -0.31 -0.02 NA 0.86 0.39 0.29 0.01 0.17 0.06 -0.04 -0.11 0.00 0.04 
Other NAFTA -0.69 -0.69 -0.50 0.86 -0.35 0.03 -0.37 -0.47 -0.51 -0.47 -0.50 -0.57 -0.49 -0.58 
Rest of America -0.23 -0.34 -0.25 0.32 0.02 0.69 -0.16 -0.09 -0.24 -0.28 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 
Japan -0.36 -0.40 -0.30 0.29 -0.22 -0.15 NA 0.51 0.52 0.12 -0.29 -0.05 -0.16 -0.07 
China+HK -0.29 -0.39 -0.21 0.28 -0.17 -0.13 0.46 -0.06 0.21 0.06 -0.24 -0.12 -0.02 -0.09 
Rest of East Asia -0.38 -0.37 -0.28 0.13 -0.31 -0.19 0.38 0.54 0.28 0.19 -0.27 -0.14 0.04 -0.12 
Rest of Asia -0.33 -0.41 -0.08 0.02 -0.34 -0.24 0.33 0.14 0.23 0.48 -0.07 0.07 0.20 0.17 
Northern Africa 0.37 0.15 -0.18 -0.04 -0.35 -0.08 -0.37 -0.47 -0.45 -0.28 0.35 -0.43 0.06 -0.12 
Austral Africa -0.14 -0.25 0.22 -0.19 -0.42 -0.30 0.01 -0.11 -0.17 0.18 -0.21 0.90 0.64 -0.12 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.13 -0.42 -0.27 0.26 -0.42 0.15 -0.08 0.13 -0.13 0.41 -0.08 0.31 0.43 -0.27 
ROW -0.19 0.18 -0.28 -0.08 -0.52 -0.23 0.37 0.06 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.25 
Intra continental trade is coloured. 
Source: GTAP 7. authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 11: Value-added TIBI compared to standard TIBI 
Exports         To 
From 
Europe America Asia Africa ROW
 
Euro 
Zone East North 
United 
States
North 
less US South Japan
China+
HK 
Rest of 
East 
Asia 
Rest of 
Asia North 
Austr
al 
Sub-
Saharan  
Euro Zone -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.02 
Eastern Europe -0.05 -0.09 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.06 -0.03 
Northern Europe -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
United States 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.07 
Northern America 
less US 0.09 0.11 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 
South America 0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 
Japan 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 
China+HK 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.03 
Rest of East Asia 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.00 -0.13 -0.18 -0.02 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09 
Rest of Asia 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 
Northern Africa -0.08 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.02 -0.13 0.13 -0.02 0.00 
Austral Africa 0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.14 0.06 -0.06 0.19 -0.02 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.01 0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.29 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.10 -0.07 0.06 -0.18 -0.12 0.03 
ROW 0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.06 -0.04 0.16 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.21 
Intra continental trade is coloured. 
Source: GTAP 7, authors’ calculations. 
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